It's not their job to soldier: distinguishing civilian and military in soldiers' and interpreters' accounts of peacekeeping in 1990s Bosnia-Herzegovina by Baker, Catherine.
‘It’s not their job to soldier’: distinguishing civilian and military in soldiers’ and 
interpreters’ accounts of peacekeeping in 1990s Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Catherine Baker 
University of Southampton 
 
Journal of War and Culture Studies 3:1 (2010), 137–50. 
 
Abstract:  
 
Peacekeeping operations throw the use of specialized military forces and the aim of 
accomplishing change in a civilian environment into contradiction. Organizations 
with cultures that facilitate warfighting have to reorient themselves towards achieving 
peace and consent rather than victory, making peacekeeping a process of constant 
intercultural encounters between ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ as well as between 
‘international’ and ‘local’. The force’s local employees, civilians necessary in the 
force’s military tasks, inhabited a particularly ambiguous position. Based on more 
than 30 oral history interviews with peacekeepers and local interpreters who worked 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this paper shows how four dimensions of cultural and bodily 
difference emerged from their narratives: uniforms, weapons, disruptiveness and 
training.  
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Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) blurred the concepts of civilian and 
military on various levels, from the actual mission and its restrictions on using force 
to the tasks involved in accomplishing the mission and the very space of the bases 
where soldiers served.1 International troops first travelled to BiH in 1992 as the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), mandated to guard humanitarian 
convoys and guarantee the demilitarization of the UN Safe Areas. After December 
1995 and the Dayton Peace Agreement, the multinational military force came under 
NATO control with a new mission to implement Dayton and provide continuing 
security. Personnel rotated in and out of BiH at regular (usually six-month) intervals, 
writing one or more tours in ‘the Balkans’ into hundreds of thousands of military lives.  
Most scholars of peacekeeping in BiH concentrate on the diplomatic and doctrinal 
structuring of the mission (e.g. Gow 1997; Ripley 1999; Burg and Shoup 2000; 
Thornton 2000). Some, more recently, have used ethnographic fieldwork or 
qualitative interviewing to discuss peacekeepers’ on-the-ground experiences (e.g. 
Kernic 1999; Koedijk 2002; Kretchik 2004; Bos and Soeters 2006; Sion 2008). The 
presence of a large semi-permanent military force all too often invites an informal 
economy of smuggling and sexual exploitation that undermines the intervention’s 
stated aims (Skjelsbaek 2004; Andreas 2008). These angles on the study of 
peacekeeping expose a common contradiction of using specialized military 
organizations, personnel and equipment to accomplish change in the civilian 
environment.  
In peacekeeping and peace support operations, forces with an organizational 
culture which has developed to facilitate high-intensity warfighting must reorient 
themselves around a strategic goal of peace and consent, not victory. The strategic 
studies experts Christopher Dandeker and James Gow (1999: 65–67) thus argue that 
the international force’s experiences in BiH produced a concept of ‘strategic 
peacekeeping’: intervening forces secure the theatre of war and cooperate with the 
many civilian agencies involved while the belligerent parties negotiate and implement 
a settlement. Extensive contacts between civilian and military cultures are therefore 
integral to peacekeeping today. 
Yet more intercultural encounters are built into military peacekeepers’ daily lives 
through their contacts with their bases’ local staff. The feminist International 
Relations scholar Cynthia Enloe (1990: 2) argues that military bases are ‘artificial 
societies created out of unequal relations between men and women of different races 
and classes’. Power inequalities between locals and internationals in post-war BiH 
have certainly troubled several recent anthropologists (e.g. Jansen 2006, Coles 2007, 
Gilbert 2008). The employment of locals by the international military force creates 
intercultural encounters not only between ‘internationals’ and ‘locals’ but, 
simultaneously, between civilians and the military. The categories are arguably under 
most strain when local interpreters travel with the force on core peacekeeping tasks 
outside the base.2 This paper, indeed, emerged from a research project into 
operational language support in BiH, for which the author conducted more than 30 
oral history interviews with local and international people who were involved in 
carrying out or preparing for peacekeeping work.3 Analysing and coding the data 
revealed that encounters between and constructions of civilian and military were 
central to many of the narratives, articulated around four dimensions of difference: 
uniforms, weapons, disruptiveness and training.  
 
The uniformed body 
 
Uniforms, immediate visible signs of belonging to the military rather than the civilian 
world, confer the authority of sponsoring state or non-state entities on military people 
and their actions. Beyond the battlefield function of camouflage, modern industrial 
militaries’ highly-regulated uniforms denote individual bodies as parts of the 
collective, signal organizational subdivisions to those in the know and mark out ‘the 
military figure as the specialist purveyor of the means of violence’ (Giddens 1985: 
230). The international law of war protects prisoners if they are wearing uniforms 
distinguishing them from civilians (Pfanner 2004: 118–20), and US special forces’ 
practice of wearing non-standard uniforms or local civilian clothing in Iraq and 
Afghanistan prompted a senior Defense Department attorney to reflect on whether 
violence committed by troops so dressed would be legal (Hays Parks 2003). Uniforms, 
according to the fashion theorist Jennifer Craik (2003: 130), comprise a set of ‘body 
techniques’ inscribing physical and moral discipline, conformity, formality and 
compulsion. They thus convey not only symbolic demarcations but also embodied 
expectations.  
Many components of the multinational force in BiH issued uniforms to their 
locally-employed interpreters, blurring the symbolic distinction between international 
soldier and local civilian. During the war, UNPROFOR troops operated close to or on 
front lines, exposing all members of liaison parties and patrols to sniper fire. British 
officers who managed interpreter teams (‘military supervisors’) would need to arrange 
uniforms and protective equipment for new hires. Louise, an Army linguist who 
equipped an interpreter team in 1994, explained that ‘[t]hey needed military clothing, 
because they were targets if they didn’t look like us’ – adding immediately ‘they will 
never look like British Army people, but at least they’ve got half a chance’. In 1999, 
four years after Dayton, with civilian employees at far less risk from aggression let 
alone snipers, UK forces’ local interpreters were still being issued uniforms. Andy, an 
RAF officer who had been a civil affairs officer in central Bosnia in 1999, 
distinguished between uniform and equipment when asked about interpreters’ kit. 
They would not have equipment ‘because […] it’s not their job to soldier’, though 
they would get a camouflage outfit from the stores ‘just to show that in fact they were 
working on the UK plc side’.  
The United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), who operated in BiH between 
1992 and 1995 as an unarmed military organization with members from many UN 
countries, handled the matter differently. UNMOs had no central store of personal 
equipment but brought kit from their home armed forces. A former senior UNMO 
explained the ambiguous result while showing the author a photograph of an UNMO 
team including local interpreters in civilian clothes: because all UNMOs wore their 
national uniforms, ‘there wasn’t a logical uniform for them [local interpreters] to wear, 
and so they were far less militarized, in some ways.’ UNMOs’ interpreters also lived 
in their own homes, not on a base (where interpreters employed by a UK battalion he 
had previously commanded in BiH had lived). Among the force’s national contingents, 
baseline equipment policies for troops themselves also varied with force protection 
philosophies. Under IFOR/SFOR, approaches ranged from a light-touch British policy 
drawn from Northern Ireland counter-insurgency (berets not helmets; no body armour) 
to a rigid US approach of full protective gear which left US soldiers treated with 
suspicion and distance by locals (Kretchik 2004: 34).4  
When local interpreters wore uniform, the civilian/military distinction became 
refocused on to smaller details. British soldiers’ combat jackets had inch-long UK 
flags sewn on to the upper left arm. ‘I don’t think it would have been appropriate,’ 
Louise replied when asked whether local interpreters wore the flag patches too. She 
went on to explain that ‘[w]ith the best will in the world, those interpreters were never 
going to look like soldiers’: their jackets were undone, their trousers untucked, their 
boots not ‘properly’ laced and their hair loose (conceiving of the archetypal 
interpreter as a long-haired woman). Although supplementing one’s kit with non-
standard items is perfectly ordinary in military life, the local civilians’ customizations 
seemed to transgress an accepted degree of individualization: their alterations had no 
functional justification, and indeed compromised what was understood to be the 
uniform’s primary function. The final distinction of appearance between soldiers and 
interpreters – ‘the other obvious giveaway’, as Louise put it – exceeded the symbolic 
and encompassed the means to do physical harm: ‘they didn’t carry weapons, of 
course […] I always had a sidearm while I was up country, we didn’t need them in 
[the UK brigade headquarters in] Split.’ 
The legitimized possession of a firearm was the fundamental separator between the 
military and its civilian employees. It presupposed an individual – a body – having 
received the training and internalized the discipline to use the weapon in a controlled 
and orderly way. Civilians might often have had possession of guns in demobilized, 
post-conflict BiH, but did not have the training, the right or the power to use force. 
Conversely, the military subjectivity saw armed civilians as disordered sources of risk 
that needed bringing under control, as rehearsed in pre-deployment role-play 
exercises where soldiers used interpreters to tell native ‘Serbo-Croat’ speakers to drop 
their weapons. Being accompanied by indispensable civilians who should not, would 
not and did not have guns limited soldiers’ freedom of action. Fred, an extremely 
experienced Army language instructor who had done military interpreting in BiH 
before overseeing ‘Serbo-Croat’ language training in the UK, explained the 
drawbacks of local interpreters even while praising their work. By using a military 
person with language knowledge, ‘you had an armed person who could look after 
himself or herself’, whereas ‘a young female Bosnian interpreter, or even a young 
male Bosnian interpreter’ was ‘someone else to look after’. The value of an extra 
armed person had to be weighed against the advantages of travelling with native 
speakers of the local language and the disadvantages of having to protect them in the 
unstable front-line territory of wartime central Bosnia.  
 
The armed body 
 
Narrating civilian/military intercultural encounters required interview participants to 
experience, remember, reconcile and justify the power differentials in which they and 
their interlocutors had been embedded. The force’s local employees (known to NATO 
as ‘locally-employed civilians’, although a local gaze might construct them as 
‘internationally-employed civilians’) enjoyed certain privileges of protection relative 
to other local civilians, not least the right to be evacuated if the troops had to 
withdraw. If they were imprisoned, a powerful (though not all-powerful) organization 
would be interested in their whereabouts. Some interpreters injured at work obtained 
access to medical treatment abroad through their military employers. In April 1999, 
when UK forces in Republika Srpska (the Serb-controlled entity of post-Dayton BiH) 
anticipated riots against the NATO bombings of Serbia and Montenegro, troops in 
outlying towns temporarily withdrew to the Banja Luka main base. They took their 
local interpreters along – although one of these interpreters complained that their 
military supervisor had not bothered to arrange them accommodation there. The 
evacuation privilege set local workers apart from their own friends, neighbours and 
families. At Srebrenica, a Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) interpreter who worked for the 
UNMOs, Hasan Nuhanović, could not get his brother and parents added to a list of 
local people entitled to leave with the Dutch UN battalion in July 1995 (Koedijk 
4.4.31.1). His family were killed by the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), while Nuhanović 
survived to campaign for justice for the victims of the massacre. 
Local employees were elevated above fellow citizens through these privileges but 
still experienced a power inequality relative to international soldiers. This inequality 
resembled the double asymmetry of their economic position, where they would earn 
much more than a local company or state institution would pay but would still receive 
less than the going rate in the force’s home country. However, not even the soldiers 
had limitless physical power. Their own power was regulated by rules of engagement 
(ROE) and relativized situationally: body armour and a sidearm would have different 
values depending on whether one was on street patrol talking to civilians, 
outnumbered by local soldiers at a checkpoint or coming under artillery fire.  
Certain missions or career tracks also complicated the military ideal of weapons 
proficiency. After BiH, Louise had subsequently gone on a humanitarian mission to 
Rwanda with a parachute field ambulance. She remembered anxieties about the Army 
doctors, whose Sandhurst training had been ‘a four-week course to […] do a bit of 
marching, a bit of polish on boots, and how to put a uniform on’. They therefore had 
not ‘done quite as much weapon training’ as other army officers, although ‘my fears 
were totally unfounded, they were the most professional soldiers ever’. The UN’s 
decision not to arm UNMOs made them even more ambiguous. The senior UNMO 
quoted above compared himself to the local civilian staff – ‘We were as unarmed as 
the interpreters’ – as he explained the UNMOs’ parameters: they could only threaten 
to withhold UN resources such as aid convoys, ambulances or helicopters and could 
not compel action through direct physical force or even direct financial inducements. 
At the same time, he believed unarmed military observers had been preferable to a US 
proposal for a post-Dayton armed observer organization. The weapon had not been 
essential to the task (‘striding around with a pistol on your hip doesn’t make you a 
more effective liaison officer’), as central as it was to a fundamental understanding of 
the trained military body.  
The UN mandate and UNPROFOR’s ROE had even more problematic effects on 
soldiers’ perceptions of their capacity to fulfil their professional and military identities. 
One Danish conscript, a volunteer for UNPROFOR in Croatia, felt that the UN’s need 
for transparency had threatened the troops’ ability to do their job, telling the author: 
‘When you are a UN soldier […] you are actually not working almost like a soldier, 
because when you are on these [observation] posts you always have to be so visible.’ 
He considered that his comrades would not actually have exercised the ROE 
permissions to use force. Groups of soldiers who saw themselves as their military’s 
elite may have had particular difficulties adapting to peacekeeping missions. Donna 
Winslow (2004: 9) thus identifies the Canadian Airborne Regiment’s sense of 
superiority to other troops as a contributing factor in mistreatment of Somali prisoners, 
and the Dutch report into the Srebrenica massacre similarly suggested that the red-
bereted Airmobile Brigade’s elite identity produced intolerance towards outsiders and 
an inability to see locals as individuals (Frankfort 2002: 2.8.4.1). When the UN 
passed the military mission in BiH to NATO after Dayton, the NATO force was 
empowered to implement Dayton by force if necessary but did not meet anticipated 
resistance levels. Perhaps paradoxically, non-elite Austrian soldiers who had 
volunteered for an IFOR transport unit then felt disappointed because they had 
expected being able to fight (unlike traditional UN peacekeeping) and were left to 
cope in a peace-building situation that ‘challenged the soldiers’ self-esteem as 
warriors’ (Kernic 1999: 122–23).  
The restrictions imposed during the war by the UNPROFOR mandate left many 
peacekeepers – for instance, British witnesses to the Bosniak–Croat conflict – feeling 
stripped of their power to confront local armed forces and save civilian lives. The 
mandate’s focus on safeguarding aid convoys not humans, and the difficulties of 
obtaining air-strikes, both interfered with the belief that innocent civilians required 
protection and that it was the soldier’s task to provide it. In April 1993, the first 
British battalion in BiH dealt with the aftermath of the massacre at Ahmići, where 
Bosnian Croat paramilitaries had murdered a village of Bosniaks by throwing 
grenades and petrol bombs into the villagers’ own homes. The clear-up operation has 
been remembered in the UK as the epitome of senseless violence in BiH and a 
particularly traumatic incident for British troops (see, e.g., Kosminsky 1999; Woolley 
2004). Chris, another of the small cadre of British military interpreters, had spent 
some time helping this battalion establish itself in BiH but had left before April. 
When asked what he thought the most dangerous time for British forces in BiH had 
been, he wanted to emphasize that ‘each battalion, each soldier will have his own 
story’ but added that Ahmići:  
 
must have been one of those worst times for our soldiers, simply because they 
had to deal with the results of… the massacre of women and children. […] We 
all saw soldiers that had lost their lives. But when you see innocent civilians, 
especially children, I think, that’s… yeah. 
 
Here, as in so many historical, fictional and visual accounts of war, women and 
children are innocent symbolic non-combatants, deserving military protection, 
supposed to remain outside the sphere of conflict and killing. These civilians’ death 
and suffering belonged to a different emotional plane from a soldier’s death, 
reflecting a normative but long-outdated ideal of conventional warfare between 
military forces that sat uncomfortably against the irregular warfare of the post-
Yugoslav conflicts. Even when peacekeeping missions frustrated soldierly identities 
on a macro-level, military personnel tended to narrate their service in BiH in terms of 
micro-level changes they had brought to local people, families, schools, hospitals and 
towns. They preserved a distinction between their own domain of action and the 
domain they acted upon. Importantly for the resolutions of their personal narratives, 
they located reasons for satisfaction and success even when the macro-level strategic 
objective of keeping the peace or ‘normalizing’ BiH invited disappointment or 
hopelessness. A tidy separation between the civilian and military worlds was, 
however, impossible to achieve when military teams were assisted practically but 
disrupted symbolically by local civilian interpreters. 
 
The disruptive body 
 
Many peacekeeping tasks required interaction with the local population, especially 
negotiating with local military and civilian power-holders, conducting inspections or 
delivering aid and resources through the civil affairs structure. Certain other language-
dependent tasks that would have fallen to the military in a classic liberation and 
occupation paradigm, such as investigating and interrogating war crimes suspects, 
instead belonged to international civilian organizations and agencies (the military 
contributed nothing more than security and logistics). Every component of the force 
nonetheless had some language support needs and dependence on local civilians. Of 
all the local staff, the distinction between military and civilian was at its most porous 
where interpreters were concerned. Cleaners, labourers, mechanics, laundresses and 
kitchen hands remained on the bounded space of the base performing various support 
functions. Interpreters, however, were untrained persons – undisciplined bodies – of a 
different nationality who were supposed to be on the soldiers’ side during military 
tasks in a foreign, potentially hostile, environment beyond the gates. The disruption 
went well beyond the level of appearance involved in the ambiguities of uniform. 
Local interpreters were indispensable to communication but also restricted the 
soldiers’ actions, mobility and speech. Informal conversations between soldiers 
(managing the boredom of much peacekeeping and travel) were self-censored in 
interpreters’ presence since locals could not be trusted not to pass on sensitive or 
tactical information. The very process of communicating through an interpreter, 
breaking up and simplifying one’s habitual speech-patterns to give the interpreter time 
to speak, could itself be wearing over a peacekeeping tour (Barry 2008: 282). Pre-
deployment training emphasized that, in dangerous situations, soldiers should look 
after interpreters before themselves. Nikola, a British bomb disposal officer, 
exemplified the tension around the interpreter’s status when he explained this part of 
his own training: treating local staff was ‘like treating another fellow soldier’ but 
imposed limitations because ‘they are unarmed’ and might lack a soldier’s ‘degree of 
training and situational awareness’.  
Physical hardship exposed further differences between soldiers and civilian 
interpreters. Resilience to discomfort is an inalienable aspect of the military 
subjectivity: initial military training accustoms the body to strenuous physical activity, 
sleep deprivation and improvised outdoor living, both as a stimulus to primary group 
bonding and as preparation for experiencing such conditions on operations. 
Interpreters, being civilians, were not expected to meet the same resilience standards – 
although those who worked during the war and lived in (e.g.) besieged Sarajevo, 
Goražde or Srebrenica were in fact experiencing greater physical danger and 
shortages at home than the peacekeepers on the base. Soldiers’ treatment of the 
interpreters varied between chivalry and disregard. Some, including the more 
involved military supervisors, attempted to arrange better living conditions for their 
employees than themselves. When Louise’s base was without showers for a week, for 
instance, she was content to improvise for herself – ‘that’s army life, you know, you 
get used to that’ – but obtained transport to drive her team of interpreters to showers 
at another British base. 
Interpreters in teams simultaneously made their own judgements about resilience. 
Edin, who had still been in his late teens when he worked for a civil–military 
cooperation (CIMIC) team, explained that he and a male colleague had volunteered 
for longer assignments to spare their female colleagues: 
 
Well, I can tell you this. In CIMIC, in the period from ’96 to 2000, there were 
four of us. Two guys and two girls. Two male and two female. So, mostly it was 
my male colleague and myself that were travelling, going out in the fields. 
Travelling a lot. You know, trying to keep our two female colleagues in the 
offices, because of course… I’m not being sexist, it’s really sometimes hard for 
a girl to go out in a field for a couple of days or several days. So, from talking to 
my male colleague, he didn’t mind also travelling a lot, because he also enjoyed 
it. 
 Q: So why was it harder for a girl to do that? 
 
A: Well, if you don’t have toilets, you know, loos, as you Brits would say, 
sometimes if you had to spend a night away from your home, at that time hotels 
or motels were in, you know, really bad shape. I remember sleeping in a 
sleeping bag out in a field, literally on the field. Even, we wouldn’t even have a 
tent at that time. So of course that’s harder on a girl than on a guy. Just normal 
stuff. 
 
Sinan, who worked for British infantry companies at Goražde during the war and later 
became an interpreter for international police missions, narrated an idea of a ‘real’ 
interpreter having gone through wartime hardship (suggesting an emerging generation 
gap in post-war BiH society). His wartime job often involved ten-day visits to isolated 
observation posts where he and the British soldiers would be sleeping in troop shelters 
with no doors, showering in freezing conditions by pouring snowmelt from a jerry-
can over each other’s bodies, and taking cover from enemy fire (Sinan’s team, like 
Edin’s, usually excused females these remote visits). While describing the OPs, he 
interjected: 
 
If I wanted to take a shower I had to take, I was just telling my colleagues the 
other day, that… as, I’m only 34 and I’m one of the most experienced in the 
EUPM [European Union Police Mission] where I’m working now. I was telling 
that they don’t know half of it. They don’t know what an interpreter really is 
without spending ten days on an OP.    
 Local interpreters’ endurance was not to be underestimated. They nonetheless lacked 
the instinctive bodily responses soldiers obtained through training; even men who had 
done military service or joined local armed forces during the war had not undergone 
the same training regime as their employers. In interviews with British military 
interpreters, the civilians’ lack of hardiness and their lack of military training were 
seen as going hand-in-hand and leaving residual needs for language-trained military 
personnel. Chris explained that taking local interpreters into certain situations was 
impractical, unsafe and inappropriate: they needed to have had Nuclear–Biological–
Chemical training before certain arms control inspections (‘obviously you can’t just 
walk into a chemical area’), and if a unit was under attack ‘you cannot necessarily 
have the girl with the flowery hair […] or the boy with the beautiful hairstyle […] 
who’s never seen any of that kind of stuff before’. 
The military person was distinguished by his or her readiness, resistance to 
exertion, proficiency with weapons and ability to look after oneself and others (Chris 
and his colleague Fred discussed local and military interpreters in similar terms). In 
certain other contexts, having to be responsible for people without these attributes in 
danger zones could produce resentment. Tony, a British artillery officer stationed near 
Prijedor in 1996, resented that on an unpredictable election day he had been asked to 
guard an inter-entity crossing point as security for civilian election monitors from the 
Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe:5 ‘they were just civilians who 
had volunteered, through philanthropy, really, to go and do this’, ‘they had no military 
training’ and they caused more problems than they solved. Yet interpreters were 
largely excused from the category of unnecessary civilian because they were seen as 
essential for carrying out the soldiers’ mission (unlike the election monitors, who 
might have been important to the broader political process in BiH but had little to 
contribute to what Tony understood as his part in the immediate mission in Prijedor). 
Their disruption to the framework of military and civilian cultures could be 
rationalized by treating interpreters as communicative tools or could be managed 
through a professionalization process that aimed to instil a military-compatible 
subjectivity.  
 
The trained body 
 
For soldiers and local civilian interpreters to work effectively together, both parties 
needed training. Whereas soldiers needed to be initiated into their responsibilities 
towards civilians, interpreters needed to internalize responsibility towards fulfilling 
the soldiers’ mission by interpreting accurately. Intensive and structured training 
based around classroom learning and role-plays was not affordable or feasible, since 
the interpreters were needed immediately and in the immediate locality. The 
interpreters’ long working hours and constant presence in military bases and vehicles 
provided some compensatory socialization but little opportunity to improve their 
interpreting skills, except when their military supervisors were themselves linguists 
who passed on some of their own knowledge.  
Chris, who had played a key role in recruiting local interpreters, had taken on the 
position of ‘chief interpreter’ and imparted a sense of professionalism to his young 
employees. This included the technique of speaking in the first person speech (rather 
than reported speech) and avoided ‘drawing attention to yourself’. Untrained 
interpreters could upstage someone ‘very easily’ and interpreters who were young, 
attractive, ‘have long flowing hair, and […] wear lipstick’ could distract listeners 
from the ‘old grumpy colonel’ beside them by flicking their hair and softening his 
speech. Chris acknowledged that male as well as female interpreters could go ‘out of 
control […] doing their own little stage act’ (‘there was one chap I remember called 
Elvis, but never mind’). The image of the attractive, distracting feminine interpreter 
does however recur in soldiers’ narratives and memoirs. Ben Barry (2008: 71), who 
commanded a British light infantry battalion in BiH in 1995–96, wrote: ‘The women 
could not resist doing everything they could to make themselves as attractive as 
possible. We would often see them arrive for work having devoted hours to their hair 
and elaborate make-up.’  
Chris had also apostrophized the interpreter who could not be expected to cope on 
a battlefield as ‘the girl with the flowery hair or the boy with the beautiful hairstyle’. 
The construction suggested that interpreters’ non-functional concern with personal 
appearance confounded the military subjectivity, but also complicated the archetypal 
gender structure of masculinity in combat and femininity supporting male warriors 
(see Elshtain 1985). Claire Duncanson (2009: 70) has argued that, during the British 
experience in BiH, an incipient ‘peacekeeping masculinity’ emerged that connected 
soldiering to ‘traditionally feminine’ practices of relationship-building and 
conversation yet did not completely displace hegemonic warfighting masculinity. By 
making sense of their own distinctiveness from scruffy aid workers, hypocritical 
politicians or ‘Balkan soldiers’ (Duncanson 2009: 72) – or, one might add, local 
interpreters – military men strove to accommodate peacekeeping within their sense of 
self, that is, their ideas of what it meant to be a soldier.  
Not only could the same constructions of flightiness and levity be ascribed to 
female and male interpreters alike, but female soldiers (at least in the UK narratives 
discussed here) enjoyed a certain unmarkedness: Louise, for instance, spoke matter-
of-factly about how ROE in Rwanda affected her own capacity to use weapons. 
Where the limits of gender-free professionalism manifested themselves were the 
military body’s biological needs and desires. When Louise had first arrived at the 
factory being turned into the British base, she and a few other female soldiers had 
slept in a curtained-off area of the factory floor. The mobile shower unit, when it 
arrived, was available to women and men at different times, and even then had to be 
monitored so that male operators did not ‘peek through and have a look at the girls.’ 
Male soldiers were all too likely to seek sexual relations with local female staff, a 
practice that Louise, as the interpreters’ supervisor, worked to stop.   
Chris and other officers in similar roles narrate that in practice local interpreters 
became accustomed to working with their military employers and conveying 
messages in a proper, orderly manner. Two factors assisted this acclimatization as the 
wartime conditions blended into a gradually stabilizing situation of negotiation mixed 
with localized civil disorder. The risks and hardship shared between soldiers and 
interpreters led to emotional responses that ranged from camaraderie, to identification 
with the international troops, to sexual relationships and marriage. Meanwhile, the 
generally improving security situation saw a decline of the combat subjectivity and 
the spread of a managerial, office-job approach to the mission in BiH (albeit with fear 
that civil unrest or broken-down negotiations could see violence resume). The most 
likely obstacle to these familiarization processes was the routinization of military 
supervision amid a tendency to view interpreters as tools not comrades. Andy 
explained that soldiers and interpreters had not socialized at all at the base where he 
worked in 1999: the interpreter was ‘a tool […] not your best buddy, he’s not 
somebody you grew up with’, whereas groups of soldiers were ‘slightly more 
homogenous’ and had ‘been together for a long time’.  
This was quite unlike the picture of social relations between soldiers and 
interpreters at British bases in Vitez and Tuzla during the war, where interpreters had 
had access to the officers’ mess and accompanied off-duty soldiers (or vice versa) to 
social events in town. The transformation made for a more managerial and office-like 
environment, but risked being over-extended into impersonal interpersonal 
relationships with local employees themselves. One woman who worked on a small 
British base in the RS in the late 1990s spoke of her resentment at hearing soldiers 
being briefed not to forget their helmets, body armour, satellite phones and 
interpreters – ‘And we were like, as if I am [a] tool, sorry, excuse me?’  
An alternative means of accommodating local employees within a military 
environment was to enable them to develop a professional interpreter’s subjectivity 
within a system of supervision under international civilian linguists. In 2000, Edin’s 
office was amalgamated into a new structure for language services at the SFOR 
headquarters. He remembered it as a positive experience because ‘we were all 
civilians’ and, in particular, because the structure had calmed down the working day: 
soldiers could no longer walk straight into their office with competing tasks, because 
a front desk officer now mediated between them and the interpreters. Adapting to the 
discipline of being a civilian on a military base was – interpreters who had thrived at 
the headquarters organization believed – the trade-off for being able to work in what 
they considered the most professional of the many international organizations that 
hired local language staff. Others weighed the heavily regulated workplace 
environment against their friendships with local colleagues and the high rates of pay 
that might enable them to support their family, rebuild property destroyed during the 
war or pursue higher education abroad. Constructions of civilian and military had 
their material consequences when they played into employees’ decisions to join, stay 
in or leave the alien but rewarding environment of BiH’s transient new garrisons.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A lasting sign of local civilians’ familiarity, if not comfort, with the military 
environment of the base was their adaptation to military vocabulary. The demands of 
coming to terms with unfamiliar acronyms, equipment and jargon made experienced 
employees ever more effective and valuable. Through day-to-day life with soldiers, 
they often acquired military or regional slang which they continued to use in English 
during their interviews in 2009: one man spoke of soldiers entering the tea-room ‘for 
a drink, for a brew’ and one woman described herself as ‘gutted’ when her primary 
school had not let children choose which foreign language to learn. Another woman 
had been a professional translator before the war and ended up working as a media 
analyst for the French force in command of UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo. The next 
time she visited France, she remembered, her French friends had jokingly remarked 
that she had started to talk ‘like a Légionnaire, like a military’ because the soldiers’ 
vocabulary had influenced what had been her ‘intellectual, academically-educated 
French.’ In a mirror image of this process, international soldiers who received military 
language training found that their own skills in the local language were limited 
outside a military context. Louise recalled: ‘I can remember phrases like mirovni 
pregovori, peace talks, etničko čišćenje, ethnic cleansing. I couldn’t order a pound of 
bananas. Don’t have the vocabulary. We didn’t learn that.’ For both groups, 
international and local, their language skills were shaped by the tasks they prepared 
for and their experiences whilst working towards military objectives.  
Contemporary military operations impose various civilian/military encounters 
upon deployed armed forces, especially on units involved in humanitarian aid. Based 
on interviews with international soldiers and relief workers in BiH and Haiti, Laura 
Miller (1999) concluded that NGO employees who had come to appreciate military 
security and logistics capability tended to believe that the military should actually take 
a greater role in humanitarian work such as demining. Their opposition to the 
military’s primary warfighting role was still a constant source of tension, although 
Miller argued that this gave relief organizations an important function as a check on 
peacekeepers’ behaviour in the absence of any more regularized oversight.  
Embedded journalists are closer still to the interpreters paradigm because they, 
unlike aid workers and like local interpreters, are present in daily military life inside 
and outside camp. During the war in Iraq, the practice of embedded journalism risked 
turning reporters into propagandists but also enabled bottom-up accounts of tactical 
failures and friendly fire incidents drawing on troops on the ground rather than press 
spokespeople (Kellner 2004). It also tended to produce ‘enculturation’ as journalists 
built up trust with soldiers over a short but intense period and became likely to 
internalize the unit’s values (Pfau et al. 2004: 76–78): thus, for instance, Ronald Paul 
Larson (2004), a journalist from Wisconsin who was embedded with the US Army’s 
36th Engineer Group as it advanced towards Baghdad in 2003, wrote that sharing 
moments of physical hardship and the threat of attack did the most to build up his 
bond with the soldiers – not unlike the soldiers–interpreters relationships in Vitez. 
Journalists, however, embed themselves with military units to achieve a divergent 
goal and on behalf of a separate organization. Local interpreters are normatively 
working to achieve the same goals as the military, and they also differ from the 
embedded journalists’ example because the journalist will typically embed with a unit 
from the same country and is able to presume some cultural familiarity. For soldiers 
to accommodate the local interpreters’ presence was a far more mundane challenge 
than for them to come to terms with the threats to their identity as a soldier than a 
peacekeeping mission could pose, but both phenomena forced them to make sense of 
what it meant to belong or not to belong to the military or civilian world. Although 
parties on both sides of the relationship found everyday ways to resolve the disruption 
and contradiction, the ultimate means of distinction remained the embodied 
subjectivity of the military profession.  
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1
 English, unlike some other languages, has no convenient noun for military people who could belong 
to any branch of the armed forces. Most military personnel in peacekeeping came from land forces, 
hence the use of ‘soldier’, although smaller numbers from naval, amphibious and air forces also 
participated. 
2
 The linguistic professions distinguish translators (workers with written language) from interpreters 
(spoken language). However, participants on both sides of the peacekeeping relationship generally use 
‘interpreter’ even when roles involved some translation. The author has chosen to follow their usage 
rather than imposing unfamiliar labels. 
3
 Interviews with Britons and Danes were in English. Bosnian participants could choose to participate 
in English (chosen by all participants mentioned here) or their own language. Some participants asked 
us to use particular pseudonyms; otherwise, the author followed Penny Summerfield’s practice 
(Summerfield 1998: 26) for interpretative oral history and chose to use pseudonyms for others. 
4
 Rod Thornton (2004: 86–88) argues that the British ‘minimum force’ philosophy dates back to mid-
nineteenth-century imperial policing practices based on Victorian common law, evangelical 
Protestantism and behavioural norms for officers. Most accounts overlook this longer-term history and 
primarily relate it to counter-insurgency in Northern Ireland.  
5
 See Kimberley Coles’s critical ethnography (2007) of OSCE election supervision and the 
‘democratization’ process (Coles 2007).  
